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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the Washington State legislature passed the Sexually Vi-
olent Predators Act ("SVPA"),' a revised version of a sexual psycho-
path statute2 that the very same legislature had voted to repeal just six
years earlier.3 The passage of the Washington Act, which allows for
the indefinite civil commitment of certain sexual offenders, immediately
generated a great deal of interest among scholars and practitioners,4 at
least in part because it came at a time when the clear national trend
was toward the abolition of sexual psychopath statutes.5 Washington's
return to the use of a sexual psychopath civil commitment scheme to
address the problems surrounding sex crime recidivism initially seemed
surprising, particularly in light of the severe criticism from the legal
community and the psychiatric community that had led to the wide-
spread repeal of most sexual psychopath statutes.6 Nonetheless, it
quickly proved to be far f om anomalous. In the past two years, three
other states have enacted legislation modeled closely upon the SVPA
and two others have modified existing statutes to expand the use of civil
commitment to detain sex offenders.7 Indeed, Washington's strategy in
handling the difficult legal and social issues surrounding sex crime re-
cidivism seems to have been the beginning of a new legislative trend.
This article seeks to respond to the emerging reality that a wide-
spread return to sexual psychopath laws, while regrettable, is inevita-
ble. The current political and legal climate makes the continued pas-
1. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010-.120 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
2. This article uses the term "sexual psychopath statute" to refer generically to statutes that
have allowed for the detention of sex offenders outside of the ordinary procedures for the convic-
tion and sentencing of criminal offenders. Similarly, this article uses the term "sexual psychopath"
to describe the individuals to whom those statutes have been intended to apply. While states have
historically used a variety of terms to describe these individuals, the term "sexual predator" seems
to be the current fashionable term. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West
1992); IOWA CODE § 709C.2(4) (Supp. 1995).
3. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.06.005 (1992).
4. See, e.g., Predators and Politics: A Symposium on Washington's Sexually Violent
Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 507 (1992).
5. Carol Veneziano & Louis Veneziano, An Analysis of Legal Trends in the Disposition of
Sex Crimes: Implications for Theory, Research, and Policy, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 216
(1987).
6. See infra parts II.C-D.
7. See infra part IV.A.
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sage of such statutes highly probable, and it seems virtually certain
that these statutes will continue to survive constitutional scrutiny.
Given that premise, this article proposes a statutory scheme that would
minimize the injustices caused by the use of sexual psychopath statutes.
At the same time, this article argues that the proposed statutory
scheme, while still problematic in many respects, would offer some ad-
vantages over the way the criminal justice system currently addresses
the issue of sex crime recidivism. After a survey and analysis of the
growth and demise of previous sexual psychopath statutes, 8 this article
discusses the reasons for the appearance of the Washington statute and
those that have followed it at a time when most other states had moved
away from the sexual psychopath approach. Because state legislatures
seem to be turning to the SVPA for guidance, this article devotes sig-
nificant attention to the development, features, and status of that stat-
ute. The passage of these new sexual psychopath statutes, this article
maintains, represents the beginning of a new era of sexual psychopath
legislation justified not by the primary goal of rehabilitating and treat-
ing sexual offenders, but rather by the primary goal of preventively
detaining them. The new approach still revolves around the use of psy-
chiatric predictions of future dangerousness to justify potentially exten-
sive preventive detention. The difference is that, while the older statutes
used civil commitment in lieu of criminal sentencing, the new statutes
use civil commitment to add an indefinite period of preventive detention
at the expiration of a criminal sentence. While these new statutes,
which have generally been passed in conjunction with statutes imposing
much longer minimum sentences for various sexual offenses, represent
little more than an effort to retroactively extend criminal sentences for
previously convicted offenders, it seems clear that they will survive con-
stitutional challenges on the Supreme Court level.9
Concluding that this legislative trend is likely to continue in an
unabated fashion, this article ultimately outlines a model statute that
would address the policy concerns behind this trend in a more honest,
productive, and morally acceptable fashion. 10 -Such a law, if it were
openly designated as a form of enhanced criminal sentencing for the
purpose of preventive detention and if it provided a full array of proce-
dural protections, could present a positive alternative to this legislative
trend and to the criminal sentencing practices currently in place in
8. See infra part II.
9. See infra part IV.B.
10. See infra part V.A.
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most jurisdictions." While the reliance on predictions of future danger-
ousness will always inject a significant element of injustice into any
such statutory scheme, the enactment of the type of statute that is envi-
sioned here would significantly reduce the arbitrariness with which
such predictions have traditionally been made.
II. SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH STATUTES OF THE PAST
A full understanding of the context and significance of Washing-
ton's new sexual psychopath statute and those that have followed it
requires some understanding of history. The following section of this
article explores the popularity of sexual psychopath statutes in the mid-
dle part of this century and the criticisms that ultimately led to their
demise.
A. Historical Origins of the Early Sexual Psychopath Statutes
In passing the first sexual psychopath statute in the United States
in 1937,12 the state of Michigan began a trend that quickly swept the
nation. By 1950, twelve states and the District of Columbia had
adopted similar statutes."3 By 1970, another seventeen states had joined
the fold, creating a total of thirty-three states and the District of Co-
lumbia with some version of a sexual psychopath statute in effect. 14
The passage of sexual psychopath legislation generally followed
the public uproar flowing from significant publicity after one or more
particularly heinous sexual offenses.' 5 In the early part of this century,
the relatively new phenomenon of the mass media allowed for the
greater spread of news events in general and of news of sensational
sexual offenses in particular.' 6 Because sexual crimes have always
stirred up a particular mix of fear, hatred, and hysteria in this coun-
11. See infra part V.B.
12. MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 780.501-.509 (repealed 1968).
13. Edwin H. Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws, in CRIME AND THE
LEGAL PROCESS 74, 74-75 (William J. Chambliss ed., 1969).
14. Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 5, at 206.
15. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL & RONALD S. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
341 (rev. ed. 1971); Sutherland, supra note 13, at 75-77; Michael B. Roche, Note, The Plight of
the Sexual Psychopath: A Legislative Blunder and Judicial Acquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 527, 527-28 (1966).
16. See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHO-
PATH LEGISLATION: THE 30S TO THE 80s, at 853 (1977); Sutherland, supra note 13, at 76; Alan
H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 215, 215 (1960).
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try,17 legislators were called upon to act in some fashion, and the result
was the passage of sexual psychopath statutes.18 As such, the dominant
goal in the enactment of sexual psychopath laws was the creation of a
system through which sexually violent criminals could be detained in-
definitely-at least until they were thought safe to be returned to
society. 9
The form that the early sexual psychopath laws took was very
much influenced by other aspects of American culture at that time. In
the middle of this century, the United States was beginning to move
away from more traditional notions of retributive punishment and in
the direction of treatment and rehabilitation for criminal offenders.20 In
addition, psychiatry as a developing field was gaining widespread rec-
ognition, creating a public perception about the psychiatric ability to
diagnose and treat sexual dangerousness that far exceeded the estab-
lished capabilities of the profession.21 . The psychiatric community,
along with other "progressively minded" individuals, played a signifi-
cant role in the passage of sexual psychopath statutes, hopeful that
they might be "harbingers of a future in which all criminals would be
'treated'" instead of punished. 22 Because many people tended to be-
lieve that these statutes would result in extended periods of detention,
17. See Anthony D. Oliver, The Mentally Disordered Sex Offender: Facts and Fictions, 3
AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 87, 88-89 (1982-1983); Paul W. Tappan, Sentences for Sex
Criminals, 42 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 332, 335-36 (1951). One researcher, upon
finding that sex offenders are routinely sentenced "significantly more severely" than nonsex of-
fenders who have committed crimes of equivalent seriousness, concluded that the disparity is
caused by an effort on the part of members of society to "assuag[e] guilt and anxiety about the
perverse elements" in their own make up and to "emphasize[] the 'moral distance' between actor
and reactor." Anthony Walsh, Differential Sentencing Patterns Among Felony Sex Offenders and
Non-sex Offenders, 75 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 443, 457 (1984). "By dramatizing the evil of
sexual crimes," he concluded, "we are able to draw the line between the 'perverts' and ourselves;
the harsher the punishment, the sharper the line." Id. at 457-58.
18. See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 341; Frederick J. Hacker & Marcel Frym, The
Sexual Psychopath Act in Practice: A Critical Discussion, 43 CAL. L. REV. 766, 767 (1955);
Sutherland, supra note 13, at 75-79.
19. See Anthony D. Oliver, The Sex Offender: Lessons From the California Experience, 5
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 403, 406 (1982); Hacker & Frym, supra note 18, at 767.
20. See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 343; Hacker & Frym, supra note 18, at 766-
67; Sutherland, supra note 13, at 79.
21. See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 16, at 853; Sutherland,
supra note 13, at 78-79; Tappan, supra note 17, at 336; S. Steven Yang, Treatability of the Sex
Offender: Considerations of Etiology, Pathology, and Treatment in Repealing Sexually Danger-
ous Offender Statutes, 8 MED. & L. 319, 326 (1989).
22. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 16, at 842; see Hacker &
Frym, supra note 18, at 766-67; Sutherland, supra note 13, at 77-78.
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the statutes had broad appeal to "the diverse strivings and tendencies
of both the treatment-minded and the punishment-minded. ' 23
The consequence of these dual forces behind the passage of sexual
psychopath laws was the creation of statutes that served neither con-
stituency very faithfully. In many jurisdictions the statutes were rarely
used, either because the treatment facilities that they depended upon
never became available or because their use failed to result in the ex-
tended institutionalization that their supporters had envisioned. 2 In
those jurisdictions in which the statutes were regularly employed, they
were often used to detain relatively minor sex offenders for extended
periods of time or to detain individuals against whom there was insuffi-
cient evidence for the state to obtain a criminal conviction.25
B. Design of the Early Sexual Psychopath Statutes
The sexual psychopath statutes that were enacted prior to the
Washington statute varied widely in a number of respects, but also
shared many common elements. Generally, the statutes required at
least two findings before an individual could be deemed a sexual psy-
chopath: a finding that the individual had some form of mental defect
or impairment, often described as an inability to control one's sexual
behavior; and a finding that the individual had committed an overt act,
usually of a sexual nature.2 The overt act requirement varied from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with some statutes requiring a criminal con-
viction, others merely a criminal accusation, and still others requiring
only good cause to believe that the person might commit an overt act in
the future.27
23. Hacker & Frym, supra note 18, at 767.
24. See Edwin H. Sutherland, The Sexual Psychopath Laws, 40 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE ScI. 543, 553 (1950). The early sexual psychopath statutes, with the "notable excep-
tions" of those in Wisconsin and California, were reportedly "not widely applied." BRAKEL &
ROCK, supra note 15, at 348. Although both Wisconsin and California repealed those sexual
psychopath laws, some other states have continued to employ older sexual psychopath laws in
significant numbers. See Yang, supra note 21, at 320. While it remains unclear at this relatively
early stage how extensively Washington will employ its statute, in the first two years after the
statute was enacted, nine persons were committed as sexually violent predators pursuant to the
statute. COMMUNITY PROTECTION RESEARCH PROJECT, WASHINGTON STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL-
ICY, FINDINGS FROM THE COMMUNITY PROTECTION RESEARCH PROJECT: A CHARTBOOK 18 (3d
ed. 1992).
25. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
26. Roche, supra note 15, at 529.
27. Id. at 530-31; Alan H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis,
51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 215, 216 (1960). Incredibly, Washington's previous
statute even allowed for a commitment proceeding following an acquittal on the criminal charges.
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While some statutes allowed a sexual psychopath proceeding to be
initiated only by a criminal prosecutor, others allowed such proceedings
to be initiated by a judge, a criminal defendant, or even simply any
interested party.28 Once a proceeding was initiated, some sort of hear-
ing was usually required under the statutes, although the required find-
ings at that hearing, the identity of the finder of fact, the burden of
proof, and the procedural rules to be followed varied greatly.29 While
many of the more recent statutes established procedures consistent with
standard criminal proceedings,30 including the right to counsel, the
right to present and cross-examine witnesses, the right to a trial by
jury, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, some of
the older statutes denied these basic procedural protections.31 Evidence
presented at the hearing generally included testimony from one or more
psychiatrists who had examined the defendant, sometimes involving ex-
tended observation in a hospital setting and sometimes involving as lit-
tle as one conversation.32
Upon a finding at the close of the hearing that the defendant was
a sexual psychopath, the defendant was generally committed to a pe-
riod of indefinite confinement,33 sometimes in a hospital setting and
sometimes in a prison setting.3 4 A committed sexual psychopath would
generally be released only upon a finding that he was "fully recovered"
or that he was no longer dangerous.35
C. Criticisms of the Early Sexual Psychopath Statutes
Sexual psychopath statutes came under severe and sustained criti-
cism very shortly after they began to appear.36 In order to justify the
enactment of statutes that sought to treat sex offenders differently from
all other types of criminal offenders, state legislatures purportedly re-
BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 344 n.25.
28. Swanson, supra note 27, at 216-17.
29. Id. at 217-18; Roche, supra note 15, at 534-35.
30. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 345.
31. Swanson, supra note 27, at 218; Roche, supra note 15, at 534-35.
32. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 344-45.
33. Id. at 345-46; Roche, supra note 15, at 535.
34. Roche, supra note 15, at 535.
35. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 346.
36. For some earlier criticisms of sexual psychopath statutes, see, e.g., Sutherland, supra
note 24 (written in 1950); Tappan, supra note 17 (written in 1951). In Illinois, a law review
article criticizing the statute appeared before the statute was even enacted. See W. Scott Stewart,
Concerning Proposed Legislation for the Commitment of Sex Offenders, 3 J. MARSHALL L.Q. 407
(1938).
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lied on several assumptions that were quickly assailed as either un-
proven or patently false.3 7 It was assumed that many sex offenses were
committed by an identifiable class of "sexual psychopaths" who shared
some particular psychiatric diagnosis and who reoffended at a higher
rate than other criminals or "ordinary" sex offenders.38 Further, it was
assumed that those individuals could be rendered harmless through
some form of psychiatric treatment in a way that was not viable for
other criminals.3 9 It also was assumed that professionals could predict
reliably when an individual was so "cured."40 The result of employing
the statutes was presumably to be a reduction in the overall rate of sex
crimes by the institutionalization of these sexual psychopaths, 4' partic-
ularly since their return to society would be conditioned on their suc-
cessful treatment.
The process of trying to identify an individual as a sexual psycho-
path was fraught with a variety of problems. Most critics of sexual
psychopath statutes maintained that the term "sexual psychopath" or
any other equivalent term is devoid of any diagnostic validity.4 These
critics pointed out that an act of sexual violence, in and of itself, is not
the manifestation of any single mental disturbance, but rather a symp-
tom that can be attributed to any of a large number of causes.43 Since
sex offenders are a heterogeneous group that do not necessarily have
anything more in common than the fact that they have committed a
sex offense, the effort to create a diagnostic category using an act of
37. Some commentators have maintained that the state legislatures knew these assumptions
to be false or unsupported, but hid behind them in order to justify the passage of statutes that
allowed for the indefinite detention of sex offenders. See, e.g., Oliver, supra note 17, at 88; Tap-
pan, supra note 17, at 335-36.
38. See, e.g., BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 348; Oliver, supra note 19, at 406; Suth-
erland, supra note 24, at 547-48.
39. See, e.g., BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 348; Oliver, supra note 19, at 406.
40. See, e.g., BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 348; Oliver, supra note 19, at 406.
41. Interestingly, there has never been any evidence that sexual psychopath statutes have
reduced the rate of sex offenses. While no study has ever been conducted comparing jurisdictions
that have sexual psychopath statutes to those without, Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 5, at
221, it is probable that the amount of crime prevented by the enforcement of such a statute has
been negligible at best. See Nathan T. Sidley & Francis J. Stolarz, A Proposed "Dangerous Sex
Offender" Law, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 765, 765 (1973).
42. See, e.g., GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 16, at 840;
Hacker & Frym, supra note 18, at 771.
43. See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 741 (3d ed.
1985); GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 16, at 938; Oliver, supra note
19, at 406; Roche, supra note 15, at 551-52.
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sexual violence as a common denominator was completely illogical
from a psychological perspective.
Particularly when starting with a set of individuals who may share
no more than one attribute, the process of differentiating between an
"ordinary" sex offender and a sexual psychopath became an insur-
mountable task. Because "sexual psychopath" is a legal term that has
never had a generally accepted diagnostic counterpart, sexual psycho-
path statutes attempted to differentiate between sexual psychopaths
and others using terms and concepts that critics described as "to a
great degree meaningless and incomprehensible."'44 The most com-
monly cited example of such vagueness was the use of the concept of
dangerousness without any attempt to define it; absent some definition,
it was unclear whether the future harm to be protected against was a
violent sex offense, any sex offense, or even any criminal offense at
all. 5
The only distinguishing characteristic of a sexual psychopath, as
opposed to an "ordinary' sex offender, seemed to be that he or she was
alleged to be likely to commit some dangerous criminal offense in the
future. The reliance of sexual psychopath statutes on psychiatric pre-
dictions of future dangerousness in order to make this distinction was
the source of the most persistent and forceful criticism of the statutes.4 6
The psychiatric community generally accepted the propositions that
psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness are accurate
in no more than one in three cases47 and that the average psychiatrist
was no better at predicting future criminality than the average layper-
son.4 8 In fact, there is some reason to believe that the average psychia-
trist is actually worse than the average layperson at predicting future
criminality because she has a significant bias toward overprediction,
particularly in a setting in which she will be at least partially responsi-
44. Swanson, supra note 27, at 220-21.
45. See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 16, at 859; George E.
Dix, Special Dispositional Alternatives for Abnormal Offenders: Developments in the Law, in
MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 133, 153
(John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1983).
46. See, e.g., GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 16, at 863-65.
47. See JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1981).
48. Task forces of both the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychologi-
cal Association have taken the position that clinicians have no demonstrated expertise in the pre-
diction of future dangerousness. See Report of the Task Force on the Role of Psychology in the
Criminal Justice System, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1099, 1110 (1978); see also GROUP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 16, at 864-65.
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ble for the release of a sex offender into the community.49 Since there
is no single widely accepted model for making such predictions, psychi-
atrists have never received any formal training in medical school with
respect to how to make them;50 instead, they have been left to take
educated guesses that have depended largely on their own therapeutic
biases and a variety of moral and ethical value judgments related to
social control.5 ' Despite the fact that the accuracy of psychiatric pre-
dictions of future dangerousness has never been established, fact finders
have tended to grant tremendous deference to those predictions in de-
ciding whether or not an individual should be institutionalized.5 2
Thus, those sex offenders eventually labeled sexual psychopaths
have not necessarily had any attributes in common other than the fact
that they had presumably committed a sex offense in the past. As a
result, the notion that they represented a group for which a common
treatment could be prescribed was quite misguided.53 In fact, it was
never clearly established that any form of psychiatric treatment was
successful in reducing the recidivism rates of sex offenders, regardless
49. It is apparent that there are tremendous professional and emotional risks involved in
predicting that an individual is not dangerous, and that the far safer course for a professional who
is asked to make such a prediction is to overpredict dangerousness. See MONAHAN, supra note 47,
at 86; see also Tappan, supra note 17, at 335. A false prediction of dangerousness in the sexual
psychopath context will result in the inappropriate detention of an individual who will garner little
or no public sympathy; a false prediction of nondangerousness will result in the release of an
individual who then reoffends, possibly in a highly publicized fashion. See MONAHAN, supra note
47, at 86; Tappan, supra note 17, at 335. Moreover, a false prediction of dangerousness will rarely
be discovered because the individual is generally detained and the prediction never tested. A false
prediction of nondangerousness, on the other hand, will often be discovered. Bruce J. Ennis &
Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Court-
room, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 734-35 (1974); Fletcher Paddison, Note, Evolution of a Procedural
Hybrid: The Sexual Sociopath Statutes and Judicial Response, 13 CAL. W. L. REv. 90, 97
(1976). Another factor that contributes to the overprediction of dangerousness among sex offend-
ers is the high level of disdain with which sex offenders are regarded by the psychiatric commu-
nity. See generally Leo H. Berman & Lawrence Z. Freedman, Clinical Perception of Sexual
Deviates, 52 J. PSYCHOL. 157 (1961); Friedemann Pf'fflin, The Contempt of Psychiatric Experts
for Sexual Convicts: Evaluation of 936 Files from Sexual Offense Cases at Courts in the State
of Hamburg, Germany, 2 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 485 (1979).
50. Ennis & Litwack, supra note 49, at 733; Irving Prager, "Sexual Psychopathy" and
Child Molesters: The Experiment Fails, 6 J. Juv. L. 49, 76 (1982); Paddison, supra note 49, at
97.
51. See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 355; Oliver, supra note 17, at 94; Prager,
supra note 50, at 76.
52. See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 355; Anthony Granucci & Susan J. Granucci,
Indiana's Sexual Psychopath Act in Operation, 44 IND. L.J. 555, 570 (1969); Roche, supra note
15, at 552.
53. See GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 16, at 935-36.
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of their psychiatric diagnosis.54 Moreover, the facilities that were called
upon to provide treatment for committed sexual psychopaths were
chronically understaffed and underfunded, as were research efforts con-
nected to that treatment. 55
Once treatment was provided, the assumption built into the stat-
utes was that a psychiatrist would be able to determine when a sexual
psychopath was "cured" and no longer likely to commit another sex
offense. The reality was that a psychiatrist's ability to predict future
behavior was no better at this juncture than it was at the time of poten-
tial admission and was fraught with the same sort of biases against
release that existed at the initial determination of dangerousness. 56 As
a result, a period of detention as a sexual psychopath often lasted a
lifetime.5 7
In addition to pointing out that sexual psychopath statutes were
enacted based on faulty premises, critics also raised concerns about the
practical operation of the statutes. The most significant of these criti-
cisms was that the statutes were used as a method of circumventing the
criminal justice system, either to impose disproportionate sentences on
sex offenders or, in the more egregious examples, to impose sentences
on individuals who could not be tried or convicted of a criminal
charge.58 Particularly since the decision of whether to proceed under a
54. Id. at 870-71; BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 352; Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender
Recidivism:c A Review, 105 PSYCHOL BULL. 3, 25, 27 (1989); Oliver, supra note 17, at 95; Yang,
supra note 21, at 320. Recent reports, however, have begun to claim some level of success with
certain types of sexual offenders under certain treatment conditions. See generally NATHANIEL J.
PALLONE, REHABILITATING SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS: LEGISLATIVE MANDATES, CLINICAL QUAN-
DRIES (1990); W.L. Marshall et al., A Three-Tiered Approach to the Rehabilitation of Incarcer-
ated Sex Offenders, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 441 (1993).
55. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 352-53; Hacker & Frym, supra note 18, at 777;
Oliver, supra note 19, at 408; Prager, supra note 50, at 71. In Colorado, a state that retains a
sexual psychopath statute, funding for the treatment of detainees has been completely eliminated.
Robin A. Carey, Comment, A Constitutional Challenge to the Release Procedures of the Colo-
rado Sex Offenders Act: Is it Just a Matter of Time?, 58 U. COLO. L. REv. 313, 314-15 (1987).
56. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. For a contrary perspective, see Prager,
supra note 50, at 76. Prager argues that clinicians who have been treating an institutionalized
inmate have a bias toward predicting nondangerousness because they have generally advocated
treatment in the first instance and because they want to believe that the treatment they have
provided has been successful. Id.
57. Morris Ploscowe noted that although sexual psychopaths in the Michigan State Prison
were designated as "visitors," "like the man who came to dinner, they were apparently there for a
long stay." MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 235 (1951).
58. See Lawrence T. Burick, An Analysis of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,
59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 254, 256 (1968) (reporting that Illinois prosecutors
employ that state's sexual psychopath statute "[o]nly when they feel they do not have enough
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sexual psychopath statute instead of an ordinary criminal statute was
frequently placed in the hands of the local prosecutor's office, 59 it is not
surprising that in practice that decision often turned on which system
would impose the longer period of detention. 0 Critics also argued that
sexual psychopath statutes allowed the state to punish an individual for
his or her status, and not just his or her actions, in a way that has been
found unconstitutional in other contexts. 6
Further criticisms of sexual psychopath statutes tended to focus on
the lack of procedural protections generally afforded an individual who
is the subject of a sexual psychopath proceeding. Although the result-
ing consequences could often be far more severe than those following
from a criminal conviction,62 sexual psychopath laws rarely provided
evidence to convict"); Oliver, supra note 17, at 88 (reporting that the use of the California sexual
psychopath statute fell off dramatically when the state courts held that the period of detention
could not exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying criminal offense); Oliver, supra note
19, at 404 (maintaining that sexual psychopath laws were "designed, by circumventing procedur-
ally restrictive criminal codes, to ensure a prolonged period of detention"); Sutherland, supra note
24, at 553 (maintaining that prosecutors use sexual psychopath laws "only when their evidence is
so weak that conviction under the criminal law is improbable"); Swanson, supra note 27, at 221
(arguing that imprecise language allows prosecutors to "stretch[] the meaning of the statutory
provisions so as to include many persons who could never be successfully prosecuted in a criminal
trial"); Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 5, at 220-21 (reporting that the threat of employing a
sexual psychopath statute is frequently used by prosecutors as leverage in plea bargaining); Carey,
supra note 55, at 324 (arguing that the "indirect effect" of the Colorado statute is to "allow the
penal system to circumvent the sentencing ranges prescribed by the legislature for sex offenses");
Joseph F. Grabowski V, Comment, The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act: An Examina-
tion of a Statute in Need of Change, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437, 445-46 (1988) (noting that the
prosecution has an incentive to proceed under the sexual psychopath statute "in cases where it
feels it does not have sufficient evidence to convict for the original crime charged"); Paddison,
supra note 49, at 114 n.154 (noting that 46% of Maryland detainees were held past the statutory
maximum sentence for the underlying criminal offense).
59. See Swanson, supra note 27, at 216.
60. See supra note 58.
61. See BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 15, at 354; Paddison, supra note 49, at 123; Susan G.
Tanenbaum, Note, Toward a Less Benevolent Despotism: The Case for Abolition of California's
MDSO Laws, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 579, 609 (1973).
62. In addition to facing the prospect of confinement exceeding the maximum permissible
criminal sentence for the alleged offense, there is also the issue of stigma connected with being
labeled a sexual psychopath. Paddison has concluded that a sexual psychopath suffers from
problems in the community even more severe than those encountered by one with a criminal con-
viction because he or she is " 'forever . . .branded with the twin marks of mental and sexual
abnormality.'" Paddison, supra note 49, at 114 (quoting People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 362
(Cal. 1975)). The sexual psychopath "is feared and, consequently, faces social ostracism and eco-
nomic discrimination." Id. In the end, the sexual psychopath's "social stigma and loss of liberty
have a greater impact upon the defendant's rights and 'interests' than do[es a simple] criminal
conviction." Id.
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some fairly basic procedural rights, such as the right to an appointed
attorney, the right to a jury, and the right to remain silent.6 3
D. Demise of the Early Sexual Psychopath Statutes
Sexual psychopath statutes reached the peak of their popularity in
the 1960s. By the 1970s, states had begun repealing their statutes in
droves, so that by the time Washington passed the SVPA in 1990, just
eleven other states and the District of Columbia had retained any ver-
sion of a sexual psychopath statute.64 While several states had revised
their statutes during the 1970s and 1980s, sometimes significantly,65
new sexual psychopath statutes were few and far between.
The demise of sexual psychopath statutes has been attributed to a
number of different factors,66 but can most easily be traced to a grow-
ing disillusionment with the concept of criminal rehabilitation and the
expanding popularity of retributive sentencing in the effort to control
crime.67 Just as the enactment of a sexual psychopath statute often
came on the heels of a highly publicized sexual offense, so too did re-
peal often follow from a similar offense committed by an individual
who had been "treated" and released from a sexual psychopath facil-
ity.68 The popular perception was that the statutes allowed violent
criminals to avoid stiff prison sentences by spending relatively short pe-
riods of detention in ineffective treatment environments.69 And just as
the enactment of the statutes had involved the unlikely coalition of
both the punishment minded and the treatment minded, the repeal of
63. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
64. Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar
Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39
UCLA L. REv. 213, 215 n.22 (1991).
65. Most of the revisions involved making the treatment voluntary for the offender. BRAKEL
Er AL, supra note 43, at 740.
66. These factors have included the complexity and expense of the procedural requirements
and litigation connected to the statutes, the unavailability or perceived ineffectiveness of treatment
efforts, and concerns about the constitutional rights of offenders subjected to detention under the
statutes. See BRAKEL ET AL, supra note 43, at 741, 743; Dix, supra note 45, at 185; Veneziano &
Veneziano, supra note 5, at 216-17.
67. See Dix, supra note 45, at 185; Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 5, at 217.
68. For example, the repeal movement in California was sparked by publicity surrounding
several brutal murders committed by sex offenders who had been held under the statute and sub-
sequently released. Prager, supra note 50, at 55-56. In Wisconsin, the highly publicized release of
a serial sex offender, even without any evidence of reoffending, contributed significantly to the
repeal of the statute. Marie T. Ransley, Comment, Repeal of the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act,
1980 WIs. L. RaV. 941, 953-54 (1980).
69. See Prager, supra note 50, at 50; Ransley, supra note 68, at 955.
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the statutes involved a similarly unlikely coalition: mental health ex-
perts, who rejected the premises that constituted the underpinnings of
the statutes;70 civil libertarians, who were concerned about what they
perceived as the extended and often arbitrary detention of individuals
without any supportable basis;71 and the more retributively oriented,
who were unsatisfied with the length of the resulting periods of deten-
tion.72 The coalition for repeal was so broad in Wisconsin in 1979, for
example, that not a single witness came forward to speak in favor of
retaining the statute, and the bill to repeal the statute was passed
unanimously in the state legislature. 3
III. WASHINGTON'S SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS ACT
The passage of Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Act in
the face of this historical context merits particular attention due to the
striking impact it has had on subsequent legislative activity in the
states. In the last two years, three states have enacted sexual psycho-
path legislation that very closely tracks the SVPA, and two others have
modified previously existing statutes based on the Washington model to
facilitate the detention and civil commitment of sexual offenders. 74
Similarly, because the Washington Supreme Court's decision upholding
the constitutionality of the SVPA is the only state supreme court deci-
sion concerning a new sexual psychopath statute, that decision merits
equal attention. The following section of this article analyzes the pas-
sage, design, and criticisms of the SVPA, concluding with a discussion
of the Washington Supreme Court's decision upholding the statute.
A. Historical Origins of the Act
Washington's SVPA, like most of its predecessor sexual psycho-
path statutes, was enacted on the heels of a very highly publicized and
particularly gruesome sexual offense. On May 20, 1989, Earl Shriner, a
convicted sex offender who had recently finished a ten-year sentence for
kidnapping and assaulting two teenage girls, raped, stabbed, and sexu-
ally mutilated a seven-year-old boy in Tacoma, Washington. 75 The
70. See, e.g., GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 16, at 853-860.
71. See, e.g., Veneziano & Veneziano, supra note 5, at 216-17.
72. See, e.g., Prager, supra note 50, at 50.
73. Ransley, supra note 68, at 949-50 n.66. This lack of dissent renders Wisconsin's passage
of a new sexual psychopath statute in 1994 particularly striking.
74. See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
75. See David Boerner, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET
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public outcry was extraordinary and the political response swift, with
the formation of a Governor's Task Force on Community Protection
within less than a month.76 Among other things, the Task Force was
charged with establishing "legal criteria for [the] confin[ement]" of
"individuals who have committed or who have threatened to commit
violent criminal acts."'7 Professor David Boerner, a Task Force mem-
ber and the chief drafter of the Act, has indicated that, due to the
prevailing political climate, any reform proposal that the Task Force
considered was ultimately measured against one fundamental question:
"If the reform had been in effect [at the time of Shriner's release],
would it have given the state the power to act to prevent [him] from
committing future violent acts? ' 78 As a result of that orientation, while
proposals to increase criminal sentences for sex offenders and for repeat
sex offenders were considered and adopted, 9 the Task Force searched
for a solution that could be applied retroactively to sex offenders who
were already in the system. Because the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto statutes prevents the retroactive application of
criminal sentences, the Task Force was forced to seek a "civil" solu-
tion. Consequently, the Task Force moved in the direction of a return
to some form of sexual psychopath statute.80
In the end, the Task Force included the Sexually Violent
Predators Act among its recommendations to the legislature.8 1 In rec-
ommending the Act, the Task Force emphasized that it was intended to
apply to individuals who were not mentally ill, and, therefore, could not
SouND L. REV. 525, 525 (1992); Gleb, supra note 64, at 213; Lisa T. Greenlees, Washington
State's Sexually Violent Predators Act: Model or Mistake?, 29 AM. Clum. L. REv. 107, 107
(1991).
76. For a detailed account of the public outcry and the formation of the Task Force, see
Boerner, supra note 75, at 526-39.
77. Id. at 538.
78. Id. at 550. It is worth noting here that the proposal I advance in part V of this article
would not pass this test. In my view, this test requires the creation of a retroactive criminal stat-
ute. While it seems probable that the United States Supreme Court would find otherwise, see
infra part IV.B, in my opinion the application of this sort of commitment statute to a previously
convicted offender would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
79. See Boerner, supra note 75, at 572-73 n.149.
80. Id. at 572. The Task Force also considered modifying the state's civil commitment sys-
tem, but rejected the idea because it felt that it "was working relatively well in accomplishing its
purpose and did not want to compromise it by giving it tasks that it was not suited for." Id. at
550.
81. See GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICF.s, FINAL REPORT pt. III, at 74-79 (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
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be detained under Washington's civil commitment scheme. 82 The Task
Force acknowledged many of the problems that had plagued previous
sexual psychopath statutes, such as the unreliability of predictions of
future dangerousness8 3 and the lack of any documented and widely ac-
cepted treatment success, 4 but asserted that progress was possible in
those areas.8 5 The legislature unanimously adopted the Task Force's
proposals with only minor modifications, 6 and the Act became effective
on July 1, 1990.87
B. Design of the Act
The most striking feature that distinguishes the Sexually Violent
Predators Act from all of the sexual psychopath statutes that preceded
it is that it explicitly provides for detention in addition to, not in lieu of,
a criminal sentence.88 While other sexual psychopath statutes had al-
lowed for the possibility of lifetime detention, those statutes had
claimed to disavow any interest in criminal punishment. 89 The Wash-
ington statute, placing first priority on punishing an offender, expresses
82. See id. pt. II, at 21.
83. See id. pt. IV, at 4.
84. Id. pt. IV, at 6.
85. Id. pt. IV, at 4, 6-7.
86. See Boerner, supra note 75, at 574-75; Stuart Scheingold et a., The Politics of Sexual
Psychopathy: Washington State's Sexual Predator Legislation, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 809,
816 (1992). One of the more significant legislative modifications involved the allocation of the
burden of proof at a release hearing held without the endorsement of the treatment officials.
While the Task Force would have required the detainee to prove that he was "safe" and would
"no longer commit predatory acts of sexual violence" if released, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 81, pt. II, at 22, the legislature placed the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the detainee was "not safe" and would be "likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence" if released. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.090(1) (West 1995) (amended 1995).
Scheingold, Olson and Pershing have commented that they "find it extraordinary" that the statute
could "make it through the legislature virtually without opposition" given that it ran contrary to
the reforms the same legislature enacted just a few years earlier when it abolished indeterminate
sentencing and the state's sexual psychopath statute. Scheingold et al., supra, at 818 n.37.
87. Gleb, supra note 64, at 214 (citing Act of Jan. 24, 1990, ch. 3, 1990 Wash. Laws 101-
1406).
88. See John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Mis-
use of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 655, 656 (1992);
Greenlees, supra note 75, at 110.
89. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986) (finding that the Illinois legislature,
in passing the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 105-1.01 to
105-12 (1985) (current version at 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 205/0.01 to 205/12 (Michie
1993)), completely disavowed any interest in punishment).
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an interest in the possibility of treatment and rehabilitation only after a
full criminal punishment has been meted out.90
The Sexually Violent Predators Act applies by its terms to "any
person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual
violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality dis-
order which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sex-
ual violence." '91 The statute specifies particular offenses that qualify as
"sexually violent,"9 2 and further narrows the applicability of the statute
by defining "predatory acts" as acts "directed towards strangers or in-
dividuals with whom a relationship has been established or promoted
for the primary purpose of victimization."93 Under the statute, either a
local prosecutor or the attorney general may file a petition alleging that
an individual is a sexually violent predator.9 4 If the court hearing the
petition finds that probable cause exists to believe that the individual
meets the statutory criteria, the individual is then taken into custody
for professional evaluation. 5 Within forty-five days of the filing of the
petition, the court must hold a trial to determine whether or not the
individual is a "sexually violent predator." 96
At the trial, the detainee is entitled to some specified procedural
protections, including the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to
90. See La Fond, supra note 88, at 695-96; Brief of Amicus Curiae for the American Civil
Liberties Union of Washington at 30, In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (No. 57837-1)
[hereinafter ACLU Brief]. In Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's
Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SoUND L. Rav. 597 (1992), the author, a re-
nowned psychiatrist and professor, has provided a cogent explanation for some of the problems
caused by a delay in treatment until after a period of incarceration. Significant delays before
treatment can allow cognitive distortions and defenses to become "further consolidated," making
it "more difficult for the offender to truly accept responsibility for his earlier behavior." Id. at 617.
In addition, delays can allow for some loss of memory of offenses that are often poorly recalled in
the best of circumstances because the offender was intoxicated at the time of the offense. Id.
These and other problems are exaggerated when the delay involves time spent in prison. "Most
maximum security correctional facilities are violent, threatening, antisocial milieus in which an
inmate is socialized to avoid disclosing personal weakness or vulnerability, avoid taking responsi-
bility for his crime, or [avoid] reveal[ing] himself to be a sex offender for fear of retaliation." Id.
91. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West 1995) (amended 1995).
92. Id. § 71.09.020(4). The enumerated offenses include various categories of rape, inde-
cent liberties either by forcible compulsion or against a child under age fourteen, and child moles-
tation. Id. In addition, certain serious felony offenses can be included if determined to have been
"sexually motivated." Id.
93. Id. § 71.09.020(3). It is interesting to note that this definition excludes family mem-
bers, "who have been demonstrated to be the predominant offenders in child molestation cases."
Scheingold et al., supra note 86, at 815.
94. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.030 (West 1995) (amended 1995).
95. Id. § 71.09.040.
96. Id. § 71.09.050.
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a jury trial, the right to retain an expert witness (at state expense if the
individual is indigent), and the right to conduct an independent evalua-
tion or to testify at the trial.9 7 The statute says nothing with respect to
certain other procedural issues, such as whether hearsay evidence will
be admissible at such a trial, whether the individual has the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, and whether the individual has
the right to remain silent at any stage of the proceedings, including the
examination and the trial. The state has the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the individual is a "sexually violent
predator.""8
If found to be a sexually violent predator, the individual is "com-
mitted to the custody of the department of social and health services in
a secure facility for control, care, and treatment until such time as the
person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed
that the person is safe to be at large."99 Once detained under the stat-
ute, an individual is evaluated on a yearly basis, °00 after which a "show
cause hearing" will be held unless the detainee affirmatively waives
it.' 10 The purpose of that hearing, at which the detainee will be repre-
sented by counsel but has no right to be present, is for the court to
"determine [whether] probable cause exists to believe that the person's
mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the
person is safe to be at large and is not likely to engage in predatory
acts of sexual violence if discharged."' 1 2 A trial, at which the detainee
has the right to be present, the right to retain an expert witness, and
the right to a jury, will be held only if the court finds such probable
cause or if the Department of Social and Health Services authorizes a
petition for the detainee's release.' 03 At the trial, the state has the bur-
den of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt that the committed person's
mental abnormality or personality disorder remains such that the per-
son is not safe to be at large and if discharged is likely to engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence."'0 4 Absent a successful verdict at a
trial, a detainee will never be released from custody.'05
97. Id.
98. Id. § 71.09.060(1).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 71.09.070.
101. Id. § 71.09.090(2).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 71.09.090(1)-(2).
104. Id. § 71.09.090(l).
105. See id. § 71.09.060.
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C. Criticism of the Act
Like every sexual psychopath statute that preceded it, Washing-
ton's SVPA has engendered a great deal of criticism. Perhaps the most
consistent criticism of the statute is that it describes a diagnostic cate-
gory that has no clinical significance and then bases a commitment
scheme on that category despite the fact that the category is comprised
of individuals who may share no more than one attribute, who are not
mentally ill, and who, for the most part, are not amenable to any
known form of treatment.106 As a result, the SVPA has been described
as "an exercise in lifetime preventive detention disguised as involuntary
psychiatric treatment. 1 07
The terms and concepts used in the SVPA to determine its appli-
cability, it is argued, are just as troubling as those of its ancestors,
providing prosecutors and courts with virtually limitless discretion to
detain an individual once it has been established that the person com-
mitted a sexually violent crime at some point in the past.108 Although
the defenders of the statute point out that it requires a finding of a
sexually violent act in the past, of future dangerousness, and of a par-
ticular mental aberration, critics claim that the reality is that the last
of those three elements is illusory. The term "personality disorder," it
is said, is so broad that it includes virtually everybody to some degree
and almost certainly every sex offender.10 9 As a result, requiring a find-
ing that an offender has a "personality disorder" does little to restrict
the applicability of the statute. But even more troubling is the use of
the term "mental abnormality," which, unlike "personality disorder," is
not even a medically recognized diagnostic term.110 The statutory defi-
nition of "mental abnormality" is essentially any "condition" that "pre-
disposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts."-1 , Thus,
106. See generally ACLU Brief, supra note 90; Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Washington
State Psychiatric Association, In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (No. 57837-1) [hereinaf-
ter WSPA Brief]; La Fond, supra note 88; Wettstein, supra note 90; Brian G. Bodine, Comment,
Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System An Unconstitutional Law and
An Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rv. 105 (1990).
107. ACLU Brief, supra note 90, at 30-31.
108. See, e.g., ACLU Brief, supra note 90, at 43; Greenlees, supra note 75, at 127-28.
109. See WSPA Brief, supra note 106, at 8; Greenlees, supra note 75, at 118.
110. See Supplemental Brief of Amicus Curiae for the American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington at 9, In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter ACLU
Supp. Brief]; WSPA Brief, supra note 106, at 7; Wettstein, supra note 90, at 601; Greenlees,
supra note 75, at 114.
111. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West 1995) (amended 1995). The ACLU
described the statutory definition of mental abnormality as "simply a shorthand substitute for
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the term could mean nothing more than that the evaluator has pre-
dicted that the offender is "likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence," rendering any finding related to "mental abnormality" com-
pletely circular;"' consequently, a prediction of future dangerousness
combined with proof of a sexually violent act at any point in the past
could be sufficient to fully satisfy the legal definition of a "sexually
violent predator." '
The finding of future dangerousness, of course, continues to be
highly problematic. Not only are such predictions notoriously inaccu-
rate in the best of circumstances, but the statute also leaves unspecified
exactly what is being predicted. Critics maintain that, without any stat-
utory guidance on what the term "likely" means, a prediction of future
dangerousness could mean anything from just slightly more probable
than not to an almost absolute certainty. 4 Since no time frame is pro-
vided in the statute, the prediction could encompass only the reasona-
bly foreseeable future or the rest of the offender's life; the longer the
predictive time frame, the less accurate any prediction can be.1 5
Similarly, critics claim that the release provisions built into the
Washington statute have significant definitional and operative
problems. Absent a petition for release that has been approved by the
Department of Social and Health Services, a committed offender may
be released only upon a court's finding of probable cause to believe that
"the person's condition has so changed that he or she is safe to be at
large."116 In addition to the significant problems connected to the fact
that the term "safe" is left completely undefined, there is the troubling
question of whether a "personality disorder" or "mental abnormality"
can ever be "changed." Dr. Vernon Quinsey, a renowned expert re-
describing dangerousness." ACLU Brief, supra note 90, at 25.
112. See James D. Reardon, Sexual Predators: Mental Illness or Abnormality? A Psychia-
trist's Perspective, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 849, 852 (1992); see also Wettstein, supra note
90, at 602.
113. Even these two remaining factors can often dissolve into just one: whether the individ-
ual has a background of committing sex offenses. One psychiatrist has described the logic of the
statute in the following terms: "If you commit more than one sex offense, the likelihood of doing it
again goes up; therefore, you must have a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes
you likely to commit these monstrous crimes." Reardon, supra note 112, at 852; see also John Q.
La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute: Law or Lottery? A Response to Pro-
fessor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 755, 764 (1992) (arguing that the "definitional strat-
egy [of the. statute] is a pure tautology, conflating both diagnosis and prediction with a single
incident of criminal behavior").
114. See Greenlees, supra note 75, at 115.
115. See Wettstein, supra note 90, at 607.
116. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.090(2) (West 1995) (amended 1995).
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tained by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy to review
the operation of the state's commitment center, points out that it is
"entirely unclear how a personality disorder can be changed through
treatment because most of the defining features of personality disorder
diagnoses .. .are historical in nature. 11 7 Given the widely acknowl-
edged bias that mental health professionals have in the direction of
overpredicting dangerousness,""' it is hard to imagine that a confined
sex offender will ever be classified as "safe."" 9
Another significant criticism of the Washington statute is that its
claimed interest in treatment and rehabilitation is disingenuous. At
every turn, the drafters opted for detention at the expense of maximiz-
ing the potential for therapeutic success. Most obviously, the require-
ment that an offender serve out a full criminal sentence before he may
become eligible for the treatment offered under the statute exacerbates
a number of therapeutic problems, including resentment and anger. As
Dr. Quinsey notes, the Washington statute is "not conducive to inspir-
ing motivation for treatment" because the residents of the commitment
center "perceive the law to be arbitrary and excessive. . . . It is, of
course, very difficult to form a therapeutic alliance with an embittered
clientele.' 20 A long delay between the manifestation of some form of
mental aberration and the effort to treat it also belies a bona fide inter-
est in treatment, particularly because experts agree that prolonged in-
carceration before treatment is extremely countertherapeutic.' 21 Per-
haps most importantly, the statute does not allow for consideration of
the possibility of any less-restrictive form of treatment. 2 2 Thus, a per-
son who is deemed to be a sexually violent predator will be detained in
a maximum-security facility, even if mental health professionals famil-
iar with the individual feel that treatment could be most effective in a
less-restrictive hospital setting or in an outpatient setting. Moreover,
there is no provision for the employment of a strategy of graduated
release, where an offender could be supervised in community settings
117. COMMUNITY PROTECTION RESEARCH PROJECT, WASHINGTON STATE INST. FOR PUB.
POLICY, REVIEW OF SEXUAL PREDATOR PROGRAM app. at 4 (1992) [hereinafter REVIEW].
118. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
119. See WSPA Brief, supra note 106, at 11-12; Beth K. Fujimoto, Comment, Sexual Vio-
lence, Sanity, and Safety: Constitutional Parameters for Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 879, 909 (1992); Greenlees, supra note 75, at 126.
120. REVIEW, supra note 117, app. at 4.
121. See supra note 90.
122. See Wettstein, supra note 90, at 622.
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that more closely simulate complete release from the facility. 123 Nor is
there any provision for aftercare upon release.'24 Rather, the release
decision must be made "on an all-or-none basis using information
gained entirely from a high security (and very artificial) environ-
ment."' 25 Since the likelihood of reoffending is greatest at the point of
release, largely due to the stress related to readjustment to life in the
community, the absence of community supervision and aftercare dooms
some offenders who might otherwise be slowly released to a lifetime of
incarceration.' 26 Dr. Quinsey refers to this design as a "fatal problem"
with the statute. 27
D. Legal Challenge to the Act
On August 9, 1993, the Supreme Court of Washington issued an
en banc opinion in In re Young'2 8 upholding the constitutionality of the
Sexually Violent Predators Act. That case, decided by a six to three
vote, was a consolidation of two matters in which individuals were com-
mitted after being found to be sexually violent predators. The court
reviewed a variety of constitutional and evidentiary claims arising out
of the two proceedings, ultimately concluding that, with some specific
interpretations and modifications, the statute passed constitutional
muster.
The most significant of the appellants' claims from the court's per-
spective was that the statute violated substantive due process because it
allowed for indefinite detention without meeting the standards required
for civil commitment or other legal forms of preventive detention.' 29
Because the court viewed the statute as a civil commitment scheme, it
ultimately distinguished any cases presented on the issue of preventive
detention. 30 In analyzing the SVPA as a civil commitment statute, the
court agreed with the appellants' claim that the statute should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny because it impinged on an individual's "liberty
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. REviEw, supra note 117, app. at 5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
129. Id.
130. In particular, the court noted that United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987),
which dealt with pretrial preventive detention, was inapposite because the Washington statute
"f[ell] comfortably within the 'civil commitment' category." Young, 857 P.2d at 1007 (quoting
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)).
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interest," 31 which the court recognized as "fundamental."'1 2 Having so
found, the court noted that it was required to determine whether the
statute "further[ed] compelling state interests"' 3 and whether it was
"narrowly drawn to serve those interests. 1 3 4 The first prong of the test
was dispensed with rather quickly, as the court claimed that it was
"irrefutable that the State has a compelling interest both in treating
sex predators and protecting society from their actions."' 3 5 The second
prong of the strict-scrutiny test, whether the statute was narrowly
drawn, commanded a more extensive analysis.
The court noted that prior cases had imposed several requirements
in determining whether a civil commitment statute was sufficiently nar-
rowly drawn to satisfy the strict-scrutiny test of substantive due pro-
cess. Several cases, most recently Foucha v. Louisiana,3 6 had made it
plain that a civil commitment could be justified only after a finding of
both mental illness and dangerousness, and that neither finding, stand-
ing alone, could satisfy the requirements of due process.' 3 7 The appel-
lants in Young had argued that the term "mental abnormality" that
was used in the statute did not describe a mental illness because it is
not a clinically recognized diagnosis. 38 The appellants' position was
further bolstered by the fact that the statute explicitly indicated that it
was intended to apply only to individuals who "d[id] not have a mental
disease or defect that render[ed] them appropriate for the existing vol-
untary treatment act."139 Thus, any individual with a clinically cogni-
zable mental illness seems to have been excluded from the provisions of
the Washington statute. Nonetheless, the court dismissed the argument
that only a clinically recognized diagnosis could satisfy the constitu-
tionally required finding of mental illness, further noting that legisla-
tively created and defined mental health concepts are commonplace in
the law. 40 Moreover, the court asserted that the mere fact that there is
an absence of accepted treatment modalities does not render an illness
131. Young, 857 P.2d at 1000.
132. Id. (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
137. E.g., In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1001-04 (Wash. 1993).
138. Id. at 1001 n.5.
139. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1995) (amended 1995).
140. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1001 & n.5.
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not an illness.' 4 ' Consequently, the court held that the finding of
mental illness required by due process was present in the Washington
statute.14
2
The court next addressed the due process requirement of a finding
of dangerousness. Citing a previous decision in which the Supreme
Court of Washington had held that predictions of dangerousness did
not per se violate due process, 143 the court indicated that the statute
was clearly drawn to apply only to dangerous offenders." Deference to
that same prior decision was a bit more problematic in another area,
however, in that it had found that evidence of a "recent overt act" was
required in order to civilly commit an individual consistently with due
process.'45 Noting that it "construe[s] statutes to render them constitu-
tional," 48 the court imposed a "recent overt act" requirement when an
individual has been released into the community, but not when an indi-
vidual has been incarcerated. 47 With that caveat, the court held that
the statute satisfied the requirements of due process.' 48
The other substantial claim that the court addressed was that the
statute violated procedural due process. The appellants and amici cu-
riae raised a number of procedural concerns in their briefs, 4 9 most of
which the court analyzed by comparing the SVPA with the existing
civil commitment scheme and applying an equal protection analysis.
The court began by noting that equal protection " 'does not require
that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a
distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the clas-
sification is made.' "150 Finding that sexually violent predators are
"generally considered more dangerous to others than the mentally
ill'' and that "[t]reatment methods are . . . markedly different for
141. Id. at 1003.
142. Id. at 1004.
143. Id. at 1004 n.8 (citing In re Harris, 654 P.2d 109, 111 (Wash. 1982)).
144. Id. at 1003.
145. In re Harris, 654 P.2d at 113.
146. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1009.
147. Id. Interestingly, this particular holding required the reversal of one of the two cases
being considered, in which the appellant had been released from custody for over four months
without committing any further offense. Id. The other appellant in the case had never obtained
release. Id. at 994. For those in his situation, the court indicated that requiring evidence of a
recent overt act "would create a standard which would be impossible to meet." Id. at 1008.
148. Id. at 1009.
149. See id. at 1009-15.
150. Id. at 1011 (quoting Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, Ill (1966)).
151. Id. at 1010.
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the two populations,"' 52 the court indicated that, as a general matter,
differences in the two statutory schemes might be justified.1' In most
areas that it went on to review, however, the court held that the differ-
ences were not justified. As a result, the court essentially rewrote cer-
tain parts of the statute in order to make the statute conform to the
requirements of equal protection and due process. '5 In the name of
equal protection, the court required that a tribunal hearing a sexually
violent predator petition consider less-restrictive alternatives before or-
dering confinement. 55 Noting that the state "offer[ed] no justification"
for considering less-restrictive alternatives under the civil commitment
statute and not under the SVPA, 56 the court held that equal protection
required such consideration. 17
In one last ruling on an equal protection issue, the court did accept
one difference between the SVPA and Washington's civil commitment
statute. While the civil commitment statute provides potential commit-
tees with a right to remain silent,sB the SVPA does not. The court
found that "sexually violent predators are not similarly situated to the
mentally ill in regard to the treatment methods employed, or the infor-
mation necessary to ensure that they receive proper diagnosis and
treatment.""' Because "[t]he problems associated with the treatment
of sex offenders are well documented"' 60 and because "[t]he mental
abnormalities or personality disorders involved with predatory behavior
may not be immediately apparent,"'' the court found that the "coop-
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1010-11.
154. For example, because the court held that one who is alleged to be a sexually violent
predator "is entitled to the same opportunity to appear before the court to contest detention" as
any other civil committee, the provision allowing for the detention of a sex offender for a forty-five
day evaluation period based only on an ex parte court proceeding was struck down; in its place,
the court required that detainees be provided with a hearing within seventy-two hours of the
initial detention. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1011. The dissenting opinion in the case, signed by
three justices, was highly critical of the majority for several instances in which it "read[] in re-
quirements not included by the Legislature," id. at 1019, and engaged in "judicial rewriting of the
Statute," id. at 1022. The dissent called this practice by the majority "unprincipled decisionmak-
ing at its worst." Id.
155. Id. at 1012.
156. Id. Common sense would seem to support the appellants' argument on this point that
the only true justification for this omission was the lack of any serious interest in treatment.
157. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1012. This holding required a remand of the remaining
appellant's case, in that no such consideration was given before he was ordered confined. Id.
158. See WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.200(1)(c) (West 1992).
159. In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1014.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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eration [of detainees under the statute] with the diagnosis and treat-
ment procedures is essential."'1 62
Several other holdings were integral to the determination of the
constitutionality of the statute. The court held that the statute was civil
in both design and effect, thereby eliminating any claims that it vio-
lated ex post facto or double jeopardy protections. 163 The court rejected
the appellants' argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague,
finding "[a]mple standards . . . present to guide the exercise of discre-
tion and to provide notice to potential detainees of prohibited con-
duct."'6 4 The court read the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt as an indication that the legislature intended to require jury una-
nimity in a sexually violent predator proceeding, thereby imposing that
requirement on all future proceedings.' 65
Three members of the court wrote a vigorous dissent to the court's
majority opinion. At the heart of the dissent was the rejection of the
notion that a legislature could create and use for civil commitment pur-
poses a classification that has no correlation to any medically recog-
nized diagnosis.' 6 6 The dissent maintained that such an approach raised
the specter of "an Orwellian 'dangerousness court'" in which any un-
popular attribute could be labeled a mental illness and any individual
deemed dangerous could be incarcerated. 67 The dissenters deemed the
statute "a technique of social control fundamentally incompatible with
our system of ordered liberty guaranteed by the constitution."' 68
162. Id.
163. Id. at 996-1000.
164. Id. at 1013.
165. Id. at 1012.
166. See id. at 1020-21.
167. Id. at 1019.
168. Id. In establishing its contention that the categories created in the statute are not legit-
imate categories of mental illness sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process, the dissent
focused on three main points. First, the dissent criticized the categories themselves, pointing out
that a diagnosis of a "mental abnormality" can only be derived in a circular fashion and has no
clinically recognized significance, id. at 1021, and that a diagnosis of a "personality disorder,"
while clinically meaningful, cannot be connected causally to sexually violent behavior, as required
in the statute, except through " 'speculation or meaningless circularity,'" id. (quoting Wettstein,
supra note 90, at 603). Second, the dissent noted the explicit indication in the statute that it was
intended to apply to a group of people who are not mentally ill. Id. at 1020 (citing WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1992)). And third, the dissent noted in rather scathing terms the
obvious inconsistency in the language used in the majority opinion; after holding that a finding
that a detainee fit one of the categories in the statute would be sufficient to constitute a finding of
mental illness, the majority went on to discuss ways in which sexually violent predators differ from
the "mentally ill." Id. at 1021 n.2.
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IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION
Several factors lead to the inevitable conclusion that more and
more states will continue to pass new versions of sexual psychopath
legislation and that courts will continue to uphold their constitutional-
ity. Legislative activity since the passage of the Washington statute
provides the best evidence that states will pass this sort of legislation
and that they will look toward the Washington statute for guidance in
doing so. Moreover, the passage of this kind of statute seems consistent
with a larger societal trend, both in legal decisions and in scholarly
writings, toward a greater acceptance of predictive preventive deten-
tion. While the statutes that have followed Washington's have yet to be
subjected to full judicial scrutiny, several of them are modeled on
Washington's statute. Thus, it seems safe to assume that courts will
look toward In re Young for guidance in ruling on those statutes. 6 9
Prior United States Supreme Court rulings on sexual psychopath stat-
utes, most recently Allen v. Illinois,17 0 indicate that such statutes, when
challenged, will be upheld constitutionally.
A. The Emergence of New Sexual Psychopath Statutes
Since the passage of Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Act
in 1990, five other states have followed suit, enacting legislation very
similar to and, in several cases, modeled directly upon the Washington
statute. In the past two years, Wisconsin,'1 ' Kansas,' 72 and Iowa173
have each enacted sexual psychopath statutes that track the language
of the Washington act very closely. In 1994, after a highly publicized
case in which a young girl was reportedly sexually assaulted and killed
169. The only significant recent state decision concerning the constitutionality of a sexual
psychopath statute, In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 146 (1994),
cited In re Young with approval. In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld Minnesota's
older sexual psychopath statute in the face of a constitutional challenge based on the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). In re Blodgett, 510
N.W.2d at 916.
170. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
171. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01-980.13 (West Supp. 1994). As noted earlier, see supra
note 73 and accompanying text, Wisconsin's passage of a sexual psychopath statute is particularly
striking in light of the fact that the same state's legislature had unanimously voted to repeal the
prior sexual psychopath statute fifteen years earlier. Like the situation in Washington, the facts in
Wisconsin show just how far the pendulum can swing on an issue that is this politically and
emotionally charged.
172. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01-a15 (1994).
173. IowA CODE §§ 709C.1-709C.10 (Supp. 1995).
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by a previously convicted sex offender,'74 New Jersey amended its civil
commitment statute to allow for the commitment of repeat sexual of-
fenders. 17 5 And in response to two 1994 Minnesota Supreme Court de-
cisions that ordered the release of convicted sex offenders,276 the Min-
nesota legislature unanimously passed several revisions of its sexual
psychopath statute, making it much easier to commit offenders.177 As
many as eleven other states currently have similar legislation
pending.'78
The emergence of this new form of sexual psychopath legislation is
consistent with recent thinking about the use of criminal sentencing for
the purpose of incapacitating potential future criminal offenders. In the
1960s and 1970s, much of the scholarly work on criminal sentencing
focused on the use of sentencing as a form of general deterrent or as a
means to rehabilitate a criminal offender. 17 9 By the 1980s, both crimi-
nologists and the general public began to feel that sentencing for those
purposes had proved to be a failure.'80 From the criminological point of
view, the evidence failed to support either the efficacy of the theory of
deterrence or the usefulness of any significant efforts at rehabilitation;
from the mass public's point of view, the crime problem was spiraling
out of control and the efforts to contain it were not working.'' As the
public began to cry out for longer sentences for convicted criminals,
criminologists began to focus on the retributive and incapacitative as-
pects of criminal punishment, abandoning much serious discussion of
rehabilitation and deterrence.8 2 By the early 1980s, even many of
those criminologists who had previously expressed vigorous opposition
to the notion of incapacitation as a justification for incarceration even-
tually came to embrace the use of incapacitation as part of an overall
criminal sentencing strategy. 188
174. See Jerry Gray, Sex Offender Legislation Passes the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1994,
at B6.
175. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:47-3 (Supp. 1995).
176. See In re Rickmeyer, 519 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1994); In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609
(Minn. 1994).
177. MINN. STAT. §§ 253B.02, 253B.185 (Supp. 1995).
178. Rogers Worthington, Legal Dilemma Over Sexual Predators: Paroling Potentially
Dangerous Offenders Challenges System, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 1994, News Section, at 6.
179. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPIUSONMENT (1974); JAMES Q. WILSON,
THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
180. See La Fond, supra note 88, at 663-65.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. A notable example of this phenomenon is Norval Morris. In his work The Future Of
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As part of the movement toward greater use of incapacitation, a
significant body of literature emerged in the early 1980s on the use of
"selective incapacitation." '184 That literature argued that the crime re-
duction capabilities of incarceration could be maximized by focusing
the use of incarceration on a select group of criminals who have been
identified as particularly recidivistic."8 5 While incapacitation had tradi-
tionally been recognized as an element of criminal sentencing, s18  the
movement in the direction of selective incapacitation as a dominant
motivation for sentencing constituted a significant deviation from the
Imprisonment, the noted criminologist stridently rejected the use of incapacitation as a legitimate
part of criminal sentencing, noting that the mass of literature on the subject had proved that our
ability to predict long term future violence is very inexact. See MORRIS, supra note 179, at 62-73.
He stated: "Even when a high risk group of convicted criminals is selected, and those carefully
predicted as dangerous are detained, for every three so incarcerated there is only one who would
in fact commit serious assaultive crime if all three were released." Id. at 72. Morris warned of
"the political danger" of accepting dangerousness as a justification for imprisonment, arguing that
"the punitively minded will have no difficulty in classifying [as dangerous] virtually all who cur-
rently find their miserable ways to prison and, in addition, many offenders who are currently
sentenced to probation or other community-based treatments." Id. Moreover, Morris maintained
that the use of predictions of dangerousness as a justification for imprisonment or prolonged
sentences would inevitably lead to overpredictions of dangerousness due to political pressure. Id. at
68.
By 1985, however, Morris had modified his views, arguing instead for the use of selective
incapacitation through the use of predictions of future dangerousness. In Predictions of Danger-
ousness, 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (1985), Norval Morris and
Marc Miller set out a theory of criminal punishment that allowed for the use of predictive preven-
tive detention, but only within the confines of the range of deserved punishment. Morris and
Miller maintained that "there is a range of just punishments for a given offense," and that we as a
society "lack the moral calipers to say with precision of a given punishment, 'That was a just
punishment.' All we can with precision say is: 'As we know our community and its values, that
does not seem an unjust punishment.'" Id. at 37. Using that contention as a premise, they argued
for a system that would allow for the use of a prediction of future dangerousness to enhance a
sentence within the range of "not. . . unjust punishment[s]." Id. It is essentially that system that
serves as the premise for the model statute suggested by this article.
184. See, e.g., PETER W. GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION
(1982); Jacqueline Cohen, Selective Incapacitation: An Assessment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 253
(1984); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Selective Incapacitation and the Effort to Improve the Fairness of
Existing Sentencing Practices, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 53 (1983-84); Lee S. Pershan,
Note, Selective Incapacitation and the Justifications for Imprisonment, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 385 (1983-84); Andrew von Hirsch & Don M. Gottfredson, Selective Incapacita-
tion: Some Queries About Research Design and Equity, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 11
(1983-84); Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism,
96 HARV. L. REv. 511 (1982).
185. See DEAN J. CHAMPION, MEASURING OFFENDER RISK: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SOURCEBOOK 78 (1994). See generally GREENWOOD & ABRAHAMSE, supra note 184; Feinberg,
supra note 184.
186. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 22-27 (2d ed.
1986).
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more traditional notion that a criminal sentence should be designed to
"fit the crime" rather than to promote a public policy end. By the
1990s, incapacitation had emerged as "the principal justification for
imprisonment in American criminal justice." '187
B. The Constitutional Viability of New Sexual Psychopath Statutes
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. Illinois up-
held the constitutionality of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act, which allowed for the indefinite detention of persons found by a
court to be "sexually dangerous." '88 Finding that the statute was civil,
not criminal, in nature, the Court held that those subject to detention
could not seek protection from the Fifth Amendment's guarantee
against compulsory self-incrimination. 8 ' Noting that a state's labeling
of a statute as civil, while important to the analysis, "is not always
dispositive,"'' 0 the Court found that the petitioner had not satisfied his
burden of "provid[ing] the 'clearest proof' that 'the statutory scheme
[is] so punitive either in purpose or in effect as to negate [the State's]
intention' that the proceeding be civil . . . ."I The Court found that
the act was civil in nature because the State had "disavowed any inter-
est in punishment"'192 and because the act did not "appear to promote"
what the Court described as " 'the traditional aims of punish-
ment -retribution and deterrence.' "193
A vigorous dissent picked up on a significant analytical problem
with the majority's reasoning: the Court's exclusion of rehabilitation
and incapacitation from its description of "the traditional aims of pun-
ishment." '94 The dissent noted that, following the majority's analysis, a
State could declare that its goals in an ordinary criminal statute were
"treatment" and "rehabilitation," thereby rendering all proceedings
civil in nature.9 5 Under that analysis, the dissent argued,
nothing would prevent a State from creating an entire corpus of "dangerous per-
187. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT
AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 3 (1995).
188. 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (upholding ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 105-1.01 to 105-12
(1985) (current version at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/0.01 to 205/12 (Michie 1993))).
189. Id. at 374.
190. Id. at 369.
191. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
192. Id. at 370.
193. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
194. Id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195. Id.
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son" statutes to shadow its criminal code. Indeterminate commitment would de-
rive from proven violations of criminal statutes, combined with findings of mental
disorders and "criminal propensities," and constitutional protections for criminal
defendants would be simply inapplicable. The goal would be "treatment"; the
result would be evisceration of criminal law and its accompanying protections. 198
The majority opinion in Allen solidified the Court's holding in
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, decided forty-six years
earlier, in which the Court upheld a Minnesota sexual psychopath stat-
ute against a broad-based claim that the use of indefinite detention in
that setting violated both due process and equal protection. 197 The stat-
ute at issue in Pearson simply applied the state's civil commitment laws
to persons who were found to have a "psychopathic personality," which
was defined as a
condition[] of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of cus-
tomary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of
his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irre-
sponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to
other persons. 198
Finding that the class of individuals to whom the statute applied, as
interpreted by state law, was neither too vague to satisfy due process
nor without "any rational basis" in violation of equal protection, the
Court upheld the statute.' 9
The clear sense from the Supreme Court that sexual psychopath
statutes could pass constitutional muster was thrown into some confu-
sion by the Court's 1992 decision in Foucha v. Louisiana.00 There, the
Court held that the continued detention of an insanity acquittee who
was deemed to be dangerous but no longer mentally ill violated due
process and equal protection. In so holding, the Court reiterated its
holding in Addington v. Texas2"' that a civil commitment scheme, in
order to survive constitutional scrutiny, must predicate commitment on
a finding of both dangerousness and mental illness.
That confusion seems to have been short-lived, however, as the
196. Id.
197. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1946).
198. Id. at 272 (quoting MNN. STAT. ch. 369, § 1 (1939)).
199. Id. at 274-75. The Court noted that it would not reach a number of potential proce-
dural objections to the statutory scheme because the case was litigated as a motion in limine,
rendering those objections premature. Id. at 275-77.
200. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
201. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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Washington Supreme Court held in In re Young2 0 2 that the statutory
language used in the SVPA, "mental abnormality or personality disor-
der, ' 20 3 described a mental illness sufficient to satisfy constitutional re-
quirements. In the only other case in which a state supreme court has
heard a challenge to a sexual psychopath statute based on Foucha, the
Minnesota Supreme Court similarly held in In re Blodgett that the
term "psychopathic personality" was sufficient to describe a mental ill-
ness.20 4 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case, which up-
held Minnesota's older sexual psychopath statute. While these cases
are certainly not determinative on issues of federal constitutional law,
Young in particular is likely to carry significant weight in the many
jurisdictions that have or will- have statutes modeled on the SVPA.
V. OUTLINE OF A PROPOSED SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH STATUTE
As noted above, sexual psychopath statutes have historically been
the subject of a great deal of criticism, much of it quite well founded,
from legal scholars and from the psychiatric community.20 5 Sexual psy-
chopath statutes have often been used to justify lifetime detention for
persons only believed to have committed sexual offenses, based on inap-
propriate or fictional psychiatric diagnoses and without any significant
concern for the accuracy of the predictions of future behavior that the
detention entailed as a predicate. 20 8 As many have a period of deten-
tion that has no determinate limit, these statutes have disregarded any
connection to the notions of proportionality and desert that have tradi-
tionally attached to criminal sentences.
Despite the apparent validity of these criticisms and their contin-
ued application to the new breed of sexual psychopath statutes, it
seems highly probable that the trend toward the reenactment or greater
use of sexual psychopath statutes will continue in an unabated fash-
ion.207 It seems equally probable that these statutes will continue to
survive constitutional scrutiny.20 8 Although sexual psychopath statutes,
in my view, have been disingenuous and unjust and have often reflected
poor public policy in the face of hysteria, it seems productive, in the
202. 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
203. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1) (West 1995).
204. 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.), cert. denied, 155 S. Ct. 146 (1994).
205. See supra part II.C.
206. See supra part II.C.
207. See supra part IV.A.
208. See supra part IV.B.
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face of the inevitability of their proliferation, to think about whether a
version of such a statute could be created that would constitute a useful
contribution to the effort to control sex crimes recidivism.
A. Designing a Modern Sexual Psychopath Statute
A modern and well-designed version of a sexual psychopath stat-
ute would, first and foremost, abandon the fiction that the statute is
designed primarily to provide "treatment" for the offender, and openly
acknowledge that the statute is designed primarily to detain sex offend-
ers for the purpose of incapacitation. Consequently, such a statute is
more accurately viewed as criminal, not civil, in nature in that it im-
poses an enhanced criminal sentence. This classification of a sexual
psychopath statute simply follows from the two primary conclusions
reached by the Washington Task Force when it investigated the prob-
lem of sex crimes recidivism: that there is no evidence to suggest that
sex offenders are inherently mentally ill any more or less often than
any other type of criminal offender, and that there is no evidence to
suggest that there is any viable treatment through which the vast ma-
jority of sex offenders can be "cured. '20 9 Once these premises are ac-
knowledged, as they were in Washington, any pretense that a sexual
psychopath statute is really a form of civil commitment is revealed as
purely disingenuous.
When viewed as an enhanced criminal sentence-a form of crimi-
nal punishment-it becomes clearer that the imposition of detention
under such a statute, in order to be just, must be predicated on a crimi-
nal conviction for a sexually related offense. Statutes that have allowed
the state to impose a period of detention without first having to prove
the offending behavior have lent themselves to tremendous abuse at the
hands of overly zealous prosecutors, allowing for the criminal sentenc-
ing of alleged sex offenders without the requirement of a criminal trial
and conviction. 210
After the defendant is convicted, a sentence should initially be im-
posed to reflect the needs of society with respect to retribution and de-
terrence. If the state wishes to obtain an enhanced sentence for the
purpose of incapacitation on the premise that the defendant is likely to
reoffend, it should be required to prove to a jury at a separate hearing
that there is a high probability that the defendant will commit a sexu-
209. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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ally related offense in the near future. Expert witnesses called by the
state should not be permitted to testify about "dangerousness" or about
whether the defendant is "dangerous," as those terms have buried
within them sets of unexplored premises and biases and the use of those
terms obscures the true nature of what is being described. As there is
no legitimate category of offenders who can fairly be described as "sex-
ual psychopaths," all an expert witness can legitimately offer is an as-
sessment of the probability of reoffense for that particular offender.
Consequently, expert testimony should be limited to a discussion of the
probability of the defendant's commission of one of a defined category
of sexually related offenses within a specified time period in the future.
The level of probability that needs to be proved in order to justify de-
tention should be established legislatively, as the question of how much
risk we are ready to bear in the name of a free society is a moral and
political question that ought not be left to individual caprice.211
The state's expert testimony should be based on actuarial and sta-
tistical data, not on a clinical assessment of the defendant, as there is
evidence that the use of such data will produce a more reliable and
consistent prediction of the probability of future dangerousness than
will a clinical assessment.2 12 As previously discussed, clinical assess-
ments of sexual offenders are fraught with numerous and significant
biases toward the massive overprediction of future dangerousness."' In
addition, the reliance on clinical assessments allows for the masking of
the bases underlying an assessment of dangerousness.21 4 In reality, a
clinical assessment is simply a form of inchoate statistical decision
making;21 5 bringing the underlying premises to the surface will only
211. In The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior, Professor Monahan takes a similar
position, urging psychiatrists and psychologists to limit their role in offering clinical assessments to
"providing an estimate of the probability of violent behavior," thereby "leaving to legislators or
judges the decision as to whether preventative action should be triggered." MONARAN, supra note
47, at 102. He argues that such behavior "forc[es] those in government to accept responsibility for
difficult political decisions dealing with competing claims for freedom and safety." Id.; see also
Alan M. Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional Analy-
sis, TEx. L. REv. 1277, 1317 (1973).
212. Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, Criminal Behavior as a Function of Clinical and Actua-
rial Variables in a Sexual Offender Population, 56 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL 773,
774-75 (1988); Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Sta-
tistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1424 (1979).
213. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
214. MONAHAN, supra note 47, at 83; see also Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and
Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 151 (1984); Underwood, supra note 212, at 1429-30.
215. See Underwood, supra note 212, at 1423. Professor Underwood goes on to assert that
there are real differences between clinical and statistical decision making, in that a clinical deci-
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enhance the fact finder's ability to evaluate the validity of the predic-
tion, while at the same time exposing and thereby limiting the use of
many inappropriate criteria, such as race or socioeconomic status, for
the prediction.
Because an enhanced sentence can result from such a hearing, the
statute should provide all of the protections to which a criminal defend-
ant is ordinarily entitled: the right to counsel, the right to remain si-
lent,216 the right to a trial by jury, the right to present witnesses, the
right to confront the testimony against him or her, and a burden of
proof at the level of beyond a reasonable doubt. In this respect, the
post-conviction hearing should closely resemble the hearings involved in
death penalty litigation, in which the issue at hand is future dangerous-
ness and the result of a positive finding is an enhanced criminal
sentence.2 17
With respect to the potential duration of any detention authorized
under the statute, the statute must, in order to be just, set strict param-
eters on the maximum sentencing enhancement permitted under the
statute so that the enhanced sentences do not violate the principles of
proportionality and desert. The state should delineate with respect to
each criminal statute qualifying for the imposition of an enhanced sen-
tence a maximum period of confinement. In some cases, lifetime im-
prisonment may be an appropriate maximum sentence, but the decision
about whether a particular crime can justify a lifetime sentence should
be made legislatively, not on an ad hoc basis. Sexual psychopath stat-
utes that allow for indefinite detention regardless of the seriousness of
the initial offense are patently unjust and fly in the face of our societal
notions of the appropriate use of criminal punishment. If the initial
offense is not sufficiently serious to merit a potential lifetime sentence,
then it would be unjust to impose such a sentence upon a finding of a
probability of reoffense.
In recognition that some sexual offenders, like other offenders,
have psychiatric disorders in varying degrees, the statute should pro-
vide that those offenders committed under its provisions be entitled, but
sion maker is "free to respond to individual differences whose relevance was not anticipated." Id.
216. Professor Slobogin argues that "the strongest case for [applying the Fifth Amend-
ment] can be made in the context of 'special track' sentencing when the state attempts to use an
offender's statements to enhance her penalty beyond that normally prescribed for individuals con-
victed of the same offense." Slobogin, supra note 214, at 168-69. Since such a statute allows for
"what is in effect a second penalty," he maintains that "the accusatorial model should apply." Id.
at 169.
217. For a description of this type of litigation, see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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not required, to receive psychiatric counseling and treatment.21 8 More
importantly, however, for those inmates who are interested in treat-
ment specifically oriented toward addressing their sexually deviant be-
havior, such treatment should be made readily available from the out-
set of their incarceration, preferably in a nonprison setting.
The statute should provide for the possibility of release from de-
tention during the time between the expiration of the defendant's initial
criminal sentence and the expiration of the defendant's enhanced sen-
tence. Allowing for the possibility of early release will increase a de-
fendant's incentive to participate in and cooperate with whatever treat-
ment modalities are available in the detention setting.219 For those
individuals who might be able to work toward controlling recidivistic
behavior, it is vital to provide both an incentive and an opportunity for
them to do So.2 20 Part of this process must involve the ability of the
institution to provide limited and gradual release plans that will help
integrate the defendant into society and that will monitor the defend-
ant's continued likelihood of success at avoiding a return to sexual
criminal behavior.221 Decisions about early release should be placed
into the hands of those operating the treatment aspect of the program,
and a regular petition and review procedure should be established
through which a defendant would be given the opportunity to rebut the
presumption that he continues to pose a significant threat of reoffend-
ing in the near future.
B. The Value of a Sexual Psychopath Law
A sexual psychopath statute that openly acknowledges that it is
criminal in nature and provides primarily for the enhancement of a
criminal punishment based on a prediction of future sexual violence
could have several advantages over the older and currently emerging
versions of sexual psychopath statutes, as well as over the criminal sen-
tencing practices currently in use with respect to sexual offenders.
1. Advantages over Other Sexual Psychopath Laws
One of the primary advantages of the proposed statute in compari-
218. Indeed, the denial of such treatment to any incarcerated criminal is both unwise and
unjust.
219. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
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son to other sexual psychopath statutes is that it is honest in its ap-
proach to the problem of sex crimes recidivism. Previous and current
enactments have often claimed to emphasize treatment when they have
in fact emphasized incapacitation, a form of criminal punishment. By
resisting the temptation to create a false diagnostic category, this stat-
ute would avoid the fiction that the statute is aimed at addressing a
form of mental illness rather than at addressing a form of criminal
behavior. In large part, as discussed previously, the disingenuous nature
of the most recent statutes appears to be a direct result of an effort to
avoid ex post facto restrictions that prevent the retroactive enhance-
ment of criminal sentences.22
Altering the nature of the determination that the jury is asked to
make and placing limitations on allowable expert testimony at the
hearing would further serve to enhance the honesty with which we as a
society approach the problem at hand. Rather than allowing a judge or
jury to hide behind deference to a psychiatric determination that a de-
fendant is "dangerous" or a "sexual psychopath," often essentially
meaningless or undefined terms,223 the proposed statute would ask a
jury to decide only whether the state has established beyond a reasona-
ble doubt a specified level of probability that the defendant will commit
one of a designated category of sexually related offenses in some stated
time period. The level of probability that would be required to justify
an enhanced sentence would be determined by the legislature, not by
the level of risk that a judge or jury happen to find acceptable, thereby
enhancing both fairness and consistency in the application of the
statute.
Limiting expert testimony to actuarial and statistical data, thereby
eliminating any testimony regarding a clinical assessment of the de-
fendant, will enhance the fairness of the proceedings in several respects.
First, the available evidence suggests that actuarial predictions of fu-
ture violent behavior are more accurate than clinical predictions. 224
Second, the use of actuarial testimony will reduce the infusion into the
predictive process of inappropriate factors, such as racial or socioeco-
nomic characteristics. 225 Third, the use of actuarial testimony will help
to reduce the undue reliance that juries tend to place on what they
222. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
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falsely believe to be the predictive expertise of mental health
professionals. 2 6
The requirement of a criminal conviction as a predicate for the use
of the proposed statute would avoid the worst abuses of the older sexual
psychopath statutes, in which the process was often used to circumvent
the criminal justice system in situations in which a conviction was diffi-
cult or impossible. 27 And the requirement of a full array of procedural
protections, particularly including the right to remain silent, would
similarly avoid the pitfalls of imposing an enhanced criminal sentence
through the use of compelled testimony or without every available pro-
tection of the individual rights of the defendant. Subjecting the predic-
tion at issue to an open adversarial proceeding becomes useful only
when the defendant has a full and fair opportunity to challenge both
the facts and the actuarial data upon which the prediction is
predicated.
Perhaps most importantly, this statute would introduce notions of
proportionality and desert into its functioning, again avoiding the worst
abuses of the previous and current statutes by assuring that an individ-
ual receives a sentence no longer than might otherwise be deserved
even in the absence of a prediction of future dangerousness. The pros-
pect of lifetime detention for anything less than the most serious of-
fenses would thereby be eliminated. Similarly, the proposed statute
would avoid the equally troubling, situations that arose under the older
sexual psychopath statutes in which offenders were sometimes released
after periods of confinement shorter than what the offender deserved
for the purposes of retribution and deterrence.
After sentence is imposed under the proposed statute, an offender
would have the opportunity to begin treatment immediately, rather
than at the conclusion of his or her sentence. Although the possibility
for release would exist only at the expiration of the defendant's original
criminal sentence, that period of time could be therapeutically valuable
instead of therapeutically counterproductive.2
2. Advantages over Current Criminal Sentencing Schemes
The proposed statute would provide a number of advantages over
current criminal sentencing practices. While some jurisdictions in the
226. Slobogin, supra note 214, at 145-46.
227. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
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United States have adopted various versions of determinate sentencing,
the majority of jurisdictions continue to employ indeterminate sentenc-
ing with respect to criminal offenses.229 In either context, a sentencing
judge, after a criminal conviction, is granted latitude to sentence the
convicted offender to any sentence within the permissible statutory
range. Those ranges often must cover the full gamut of offend-
ers-from the offender with a relatively low degree of culpability and
for whom the likelihood of repeat offenses seems slim to the most vio-
lent and sadistic offender for whom the likelihood of reoffense seems
great-resulting in permissible sentencing ranges that are often quite
extreme. And because sexual offenses often are charged in multiple-
count indictments, the permissible ranges often become broader still,
with the possibility of consecutive sentences for distinct but intercon-
nected offenses.230 States generally do not require a sentencing judge to
specify the proportion of the sentence, if any, that is intended to serve
the function of incapacitation, as distinguished from retribution, deter-
rence, or rehabilitation. 231 As a result, discretion, often very broad dis-
cretion, is exercised with little or no justification, and the extent to
which a judge has predicted future sexual dangerousness and the basis
or lack of basis for that prediction is rarely, if ever, exposed. The de-
fendant is granted little opportunity to controvert a prediction that he
or she may never know about, that may be based on legally impermissi-
ble factors such as race or socioeconomic status, and that may even be
based on factors that can be affirmatively disproved. The prediction of
dangerousness is thus made by a person who is probably not qualified
to make such a prediction and based on information that may or may
not be accurate but is, in any case, wholly unchallenged.
The statute that this article proposes would remedy, or at least
229. La Fond, supra note 88, at 665 & n.39.
230. For example, a defendant in New York accused of abusing the same child repeatedly
over the course of several months or years can be charged with numerous separate counts of first
degree sexual abuse under N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.65(3) (McKinney 1987). If that defendant is
convicted on all counts, the judge can choose a sentence ranging from no jail time at all to the
maximum sentence of two and one-third to seven years in prison on each count, run consecutively.
Id. §§ 60.01, 70.00(2)(d), 70.00(3)(b), 70.02(2)(b). In the latter situation, a defendant could
receive a total sentence of up to ten to twenty years in prison. Id. § 70.30(I)(c)(i). If just one
count in such an indictment charges first degree rape, which includes having sexual intercourse
with a child who is less than eleven years old, a judge could impose any sentence from the mini-
mum penalty of two to six years in prison to a total maximum penalty as high as twenty-five to
fifty years in prison. Id. §§ 70.02(3), 70.02(4), 70.30(1)(c)(iii), 130.35(3).
231. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(1972).
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ameliorate, many of the problems just described. While predictions of
future dangerousness will still be unreliable, the limitations within the
statute concerning the permissible substance of expert testimony will
assure that the bases for those predictions become the subject of a full
and fair adversarial analysis. By specifying which factors may not be
considered as part of a predictive analysis, and by prohibiting the use
of clinical assessments of future dangerousness, many of the worst
forms of discrimination and prejudice can be removed from the pro-
cess. 2 ' Unlike at a common sentencing hearing, experts in the field
could and would be called upon to describe the state of knowledge in
the area of predictions of dangerousness, and the jury would then be in
a more educated position to make a sound judgment.
The use of a jury instead of a judge would assure a more honest
assessment of the statutorily permissible factors and avoid the widely
recognized phenomenon that Professor Alan Dershowitz has described
as "judicial whispering": the process through which the prosecution
uses the informality of a courtroom setting to put before the judge fac-
tors that would never be legally permissible for consideration. 33 A
hearing on the record before a jury is not subject to such abuse; a jury
will hear only what the statute says it may hear.
Because the statute would provide the state with the ability to en-
hance punishment on the basis of a prediction of future dangerousness,
both the range and the severity of the ordinary sentencing scheme in a
given jurisdiction could be reduced, thereby enhancing both the fair-
ness and the consistency of criminal sentencing. In jurisdictions with
indeterminate sentencing, the upper ranges of the permissible
sentences, which are often designed for application to a defendant that
a judge views as highly dangerous, could be reserved for those who are
found under the statute to show a high probability of reoffending with
a sexually related offense. And in jurisdictions with determinate sen-
tencing, the statute would help avoid the unnecessary and unfair esca-
lation of entire categories of criminal offense sentences due to a public
perception that offenders who violate those statutes are highly recidivis-
tic; instead, criminal sentences would be escalated just for those mem-
bers of the sex offender population deemed to be particularly likely to
reoffend. The ability to select individually those upon whom the har-
sher sentences should fall certainly is an improvement over simply sen-
232. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
233. Dershowitz, supra note 211, at 1318.
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tencing every offender more harshly if the justification for the enhanced
sentence is a prediction of future dangerousness. Under either sentenc-
ing system, identifying and evaluating the enhanced punishment of
criminal offenders can only represent a step forward.
C. Unavoidable Dangers Inherent in a Sexual Psychopath Law
The foremost objection to the perpetuation of sexual psychopath
laws is the inherent unreliability of predictions of long-term future dan-
gerousness.234 Specific statutory requirements concerning the factors
available for use in the making of any such prediction, and a statutory
prohibition against the use of a clinical diagnosis for the making of any
such prediction, can help increase the accuracy level to some extent.
Nonetheless, the most widely accepted data indicate that such predic-
tions will probably still vastly overpredict future dangerousness.2 3 5
Thus, the criticism that any such sentencing scheme relies on inher-
ently unreliable predictions, resulting in the enhanced punishment of
"innocent" persons-that is, persons who are falsely predicted to be
dangerous-is impossible to completely rebut. On the other hand, as
previously indicated, the current sentencing schemes employed by most
states allow for the very same prediction of future dangerousness to be
made in a much less restricted and protected fashion, thereby increas-
ing the likelihood of a false prediction of dangerousness. Whether it is
better to address the existence of such a problem by incorporating it
into a statute in an effort to minimize abuses or by refusing to legiti-
mize it in a statute poses a difficult policy decision. Given the current
political climate, it is clear that we as a society are heading down the
road of significantly enhanced criminal sentencing predicated on the
fear of recidivism; it seems preferable to me to head down that road
with our headlights on.
Another viable criticism of a sexual psychopath sentencing scheme
is that it denies the appropriate role of individual free will upon which
much of our criminal justice system is predicated. Since one ought to
be punished, it is argued, only for the crimes that one has freely chosen
to commit, criminal statutes generally require some form of criminal
intent as a predicate for a conviction and a retributive sentence. Deter-
rence theory makes sense only to the extent that an individual has the
ability to choose not to commit a crime if the potential consequences
234. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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are severe enough. The enhanced sentencing of an individual based on
an assessment of what he or she may do in the future rather than what
he or she has done in the past raises an ethical problem that many
theorists find too disturbing to countenance. Again, one enters into a
difficult policy decision about whether to regulate, and thereby legiti-
mize, a common practice that may be abhorrent to our system of
justice.
The use of a sentencing hearing that will include expert testimony
will inevitably involve the widely recognized phenomenon of jury over-
reliance on purported expertise.23 6 As most jurors feel inadequately
equipped to make a prediction about future dangerousness, the pres-
ence of an "expert" who is prepared to testify that he or she is qualified
to make that judgment will result in the jury's reliance on that judg-
ment much more often than it should, and the ability of the adversarial
system to counteract that phenomenon is quite limited.237 A particular
problem arises with respect to the testimony that a hearing such as the
one proposed here involves; while it is likely that the state will be able
to produce an expert witness to predict a high probability of future
violence, it is far less likely that a defendant will be able to counter
that testimony with an expert who will predict a lower probability. 238
The best a defendant can probably hope for is an expert to testify
about the lack of validity of the factors or actuarial figures upon which
the prediction is based and about the notorious unreliability of such
predictions.23 9 In either case, the likelihood of a defendant prevailing
under such circumstances seems limited.24°
Lastly, the proposed sexual psychopath sentencing scheme, like
any other, fuels a false sense of public security and offers in response to
a severe societal problem-violent crime and very high recidivism
rates-a "solution" that is probably of minimal realistic value. On the
other hand, by providing a focused outlet for public pressure to in-
crease criminal sentences, the proposed scheme would reduce the esca-
lation of the entire sentencing structure in response to such pressure
and allow for the enhanced punishment of only a select few who might
be more appropriately targeted.
236. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
237. Slobogin, supra note 214, at 145-46 & n.178.
238. Id. at 145.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is an inevitable movement in this country toward a return to
the use of sexual psychopath statutes to address the complex problem
of sex crime recidivism. In light of the fact that these statutes seem
certain to continue to survive constitutional scrutiny, this article has
sought to provide some constructive thinking about any positive role
that a well-conceived statute could play. While even a well-designed
sexual psychopath law has a variety of serious problems and lends itself
to a number of very valid criticisms, such a scheme could actually be
an improvement over the current state of affairs in most jurisdictions.
While a sexual psychopath law by definition relies on predictions of
future dangerousness almost universally recognized as unreliable, the
statute proposed in this article might actually reduce the overall reli-
ance on such predictions and would almost certainly make the predic-
tions that are used at least somewhat more reliable.
The proposed statute has benefits that are absent in a recidivist
sentencing statute. The primary benefit, of course, is that both the
prosecutor and the jury have the opportunity to make an individualized
judgment in a particular case, thereby allowing for much greater flexi-
bility in application than does the typical recidivist statute. That flexi-
bility allows for greater consideration of a variety of highly relevant
factors beyond simply the number of prior convictions, such as the de-
fendant's culpability or blameworthiness for the present and past
crimes, the defendant's age, the recency of a prior conviction and the
defendant's age at the time of that offense, and the defendant's age at
the time of his or her first conviction. 24
1
In addition, while not an ideal situation for challenging a predic-
tion of future dangerousness, at least an adversarial hearing before a
jury will allow for a public airing of the factors that are being consid-
ered, with an opportunity, albeit somewhat limited, to challenge the
bases for and the validity of the prediction. Moreover, by imposing pro-
cedural barriers and, therefore, expense to the widespread and essen-
tially random use of predictive judgments, it is likely that the use of
such judgments will actually decline. Since public pressure for in-
creased predictive preventive detention is mounting, it seems to me the
lesser of possible evils to incorporate into a sentencing scheme the use
of unreliable predictions than to pretend, as we have in the past, that
241. See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 47, at 71-76; Hall, supra note 212, at 775; Slobogin,
supra note 214, at 121-22.
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such judgments are not being used to significantly enhance criminal
sentences under the statutory schemes in place in most states today. It
represents a more honest and open approach that is more likely to ac-
curately reflect a reasoned value judgment about the balancing of soci-
etal risk against individual freedom.
